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Abstract and Keywords
Schopenhauer is famously abusive toward his philosophical contemporary and rival, 
Friedrich William Joseph von Schelling. This chapter examines the motivations for 
Schopenhauer’s immoderate attitude and the substance behind the insults. It looks care­
fully at both the nature of the insults and substantive critical objections Schopenhauer 
had to Schelling’s philosophy, both to Schelling’s metaphysical description of the thing-in- 
itself and Schelling’s epistemic mechanism of intellectual intuition. It concludes that 
Schopenhauer’s substantive criticism is reasonable and that Schopenhauer does in fact 
avoid Schelling’s errors: still, the vehemence of the abuse is best perhaps explained by 
the proximity of their philosophies, not the distance. Indeed, both are developing meta­
physics of will with full and conflicted awareness of the Kantian epistemic strictures 
against metaphysics. In view of this, Schopenhauer is particularly concerned to mark his 
own project as legitimate by highlighting the manner in which he avoids Schelling’s er­
rors.
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Schopenhauer’s philosophical brilliance and famous stylistic virtuosity is matched by his 
equally famous and frequent displays of petty, personal name-calling and mud-slinging. 
No one vexed him more than the German Idealists: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and 
none were more frequent targets of his spiteful diatribes. Indeed, Brian Magee writes: “In 
intensity and amount, this highly personal abuse of named contemporaries or near-con­
temporaries has no equal in the history of philosophy.”1 Schopenhauer calls them 
sophists, windbags, charlatans, frauds, dishonest peddlers of nonsense, delirium, and 
crazy twaddle; he accuses them of being careerists using philosophy as simply a means of 
advancing professional status, using obscurantist, mystifying language. Their words are 
“senseless,” he writes (SW5, 508 [PP2, 508]). They are injurious to students, whom they 
lead astray by “vandalizing the legacy of Kant”;2 they are guilty of perversity, “driveling,” 
and plagiarism. In Volume 1 of Parerga and Paralipomena, Schopenhauer refuses to in­
clude any of the three in his lengthy essay on the history of philosophy—and goes out of 
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his way, in an appendix, to ensure that the reader has noticed the omission (SW5, 22f 
[PP2, 23f]).
Of his three Idealist adversaries, Schopenhauer was most ambivalent about Schelling. He 
often dismissed Fichte in a fairly perfunctory way, while Hegel was the object of a pure 
and self-assured hatred, lacking any nuance. Schopenhauer’s relationship to Schelling, by 
contrast, was more complicated: in The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Rea­
son, for instance, Hegel is “thoroughly contemptible”3 while Schelling is merely an “impu­
dent, cocky gasbag” (SW1, 11–12 [FR, 16]).
In his published works, Schopenhauer intersperses cautious and occasional praise for 
Schelling in his typical invective, calling him, in PP1, “definitely the most talented among 
(p. 50) the three [Idealists]” (SW5, 26 [PP1, 25]), and even declaring, in Volume 2 of Par­
erga and Paralipomena, “. . . where Schelling stands on Kant’s shoulders he says much 
that is good and worth remembering” (SW6, 118 [PP2, 102]). In the same discussion, he 
concedes some of Schelling’s scientific insights to be valuable.
In this chapter, we look at some features of this ambivalent relationship: the nature of 
Schopenhauer’s engagement with Schelling and some possible motivations for its occa­
sional virulence. We argue that the ambiguous attitude Schopenhauer entertains toward 
Schelling can be explained by Schopenhauer’s awkward consciousness of how much his 
project genuinely resembled that of Schelling. At the same time, if we take seriously the 
virulence of his self-distancing from Schelling (and the pejorative terms in which he often 
describes his evil twin), we can illuminate some of the distinctiveness of Schopenhauer’s 
metaphysics.
3.1 Anxiety of Influence
Recent scholarship has called some much-deserved attention to the contemporaneity of 
Schopenhauer and Schelling.4 To their contemporaries, Schelling was an obvious point of 
reference for Schopenhauer. Indeed, almost all of the first reviews of The World as Will 
and Representation note the similarities between the systems, a comparison that infuriat­
ed Schopenhauer. The first two published reviews of WWR1 indicated widespread points 
of sympathy between Schopenhauer’s thought and that of Schelling.5 The second review 
expressed particular surprise at Schopenhauer’s hostility to Schelling, as its (anonymous) 
author claimed that Schopenhauer’s main ideas were simply a rehashing of themes in 
Schelling. A further review, by the prominent philosopher, Johann Friedrich Herbart, not­
ed Schopenhauer’s proximity to Schelling in one respect; namely, that Schopenhauer is 
susceptible to the same criticism he made of Schelling, that of falling into transcendent 
metaphysical speculation rather than remaining within the bounds of knowledge estab­
lished by Kant.6 Yet another reviewer was struck simply by how “unbefitting a scholar” 
Schopenhauer’s insulting language concerning Schelling really was.7
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Schopenhauer was particularly irritated by the suggestion that his central philosophical 
insight was anticipated by Schelling, who in his middle-period works (roughly 1809–1813) 
developed a metaphysics of will as supersensuous ground of reality and wrote in his 1809 
essay, Philosophical Investigations into The Essence of Human Freedom, that “Willing is 
primal being.”8 We know from Schopenhauer’s notes that he had read this text particular­
ly carefully in the years prior to the publication of Volume 1 of The World as World in Rep­
resentation in 1818. In PP1, he has three points of rebuttal to the claim that Schelling an­
ticipated his philosophy with this insight into the primacy of will, each of which is worth 
consideration.
Schopenhauer’s first strategy is to deny that there is any direct lineage from Schelling’s 
thought to his own—but that both were influenced jointly by Kant—and so any apparent 
similarities can be accounted for in this way.
(p. 51)
The root of my philosophy already lies in the Kantian philosophy, especially in the 
doctrine of empirical and intelligible character … [and] as soon as Kant throws 
more light on the thing in itself, it looks out through its veil as will … [and conse­
quently] my philosophy is only the thinking-through-to-the-end of his. Thus we 
should not be surprised when traces of the same fundamental thought can be 
found in the philosophemes of Fichte and Schelling, which also start out from 
Kant, although there they occur without consistency, connection, and completion, 
and are thus to be seen as a mere foreshadowing of my doctrine. (SW5, 142 
[PP1, 122])
He then develops a surprisingly long and colorful list of images to illustrate this notion of 
foreshadowing and motivate his claim that, although Schelling’s ideas anticipated those 
of Schopenhauer, Schopenhauer has a prior right to them.
In general it needs to be said about this point that of every great thought, before it 
has been discovered, an anticipation makes itself known, a presentiment, a faint 
image, as in a fog, and a futile attempt to grasp it. … However only that person is 
the author of a truth who has recognized it from its ground. … However, that at 
one time or another … it has been uttered half-consciously and almost as if speak­
ing in one’s sleep … means not much more than if it were written in just so many 
letters, even if it is written in just so many words—in the same way that the finder 
of a thing is only that person who, in recognizing its value, picked it up and kept 
it, but not the one who accidentally took it in his hand and dropped it again; or, in 
the way that Columbus is the discoverer of America, but not the first shipwrecked 
person washed up there by the waves. (SW5, 142–3 [PP1, 122])
Finally, Schopenhauer enumerates a series of older writers who privileged will over intel­
lect as evidence that the idea was not original to Schelling either—that Schelling was not 
even the first shipwrecked sailor upon this particular shore (SW5, 143 [PP1, 122]). (In his 
marginal notes to the Freedom essay, Schopenhauer accuses Schelling of being derivative 
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but of another source: the whole essay is “almost only a recasting of Jacob Boehme’s Mys­
terium magnum, in which practically every sentence and every expression can be 
identified” [MR2, 354]).
Schopenhauer’s argument is curious here, and it shares something of the logic of Freud’s 
famous joke about the cracked kettle: “I am original and neither was Schelling.” For one 
thing, the Columbus metaphor is unconvincing—a polished work of philosophy is a poor 
candidate for the sort of semi-conscious stammering of an idea that would be a candidate 
point of comparison to the shipwrecked person. But more importantly, the two-way rela­
tionship between the shipwrecked party and Columbus doesn’t extend very easily to the 
three-way relations among Kant, Schopenhauer, and Schelling. Schopenhauer appears to 
be arguing that he is original with respect to Schelling at being unoriginal with respect to 
Kant. Kant, in the terms of this odd metaphor, would have to be the country, not the voy­
ager; the source of truth, not the seeker after it.
The conclusion Schopenhauer wants his readers to draw is clear even if his arguments 
are not: Schelling is not the true proprietor of the good ideas that occasionally appear in 
(p. 52) his writings. That honor goes, variously, to Kant, Schopenhauer himself, and Jakob 
Boehme. But this conclusion is of a piece with the distinctive set of insults that Schopen­
hauer persistently uses in describing Schelling’s philosophical project. Looking carefully, 
we can see that Schopenhauer’s insults are not simply poisoned darts but in fact cohere 
on a specific critical judgment: Schelling himself has nothing to say. His thoughts (when 
they truly are his own, as opposed to his many incompetent borrowings) are empty, mean­
ingless, full of air, a faint or perverse echo of a truth, lacking sense and substance.
But poisonous as these darts certainly are, we might speculate that their affective intensi­
ty is the result of another form of the anxiety of influence. Not only does Schopenhauer 
worry that his philosophy is not as original as he clearly wants it to be—he often takes 
pride in telling historical stories that insert him into the canon of philosophical greats 
while omitting his contemporaries—but he may also be worried that he is doing just what 
he is criticizing Schelling for doing, a classic case of Freudian projection. Specifically, he 
may be worried that his attacks on Schelling’s use of intellectual intuition as a means of 
doing metaphysics might also apply to his own metaphysics: both, after all, appear to 
seek to go beyond experience to the thing in itself. To see this, we need to get beyond the 
insults and look more closely at the substantive content of Schopenhauer’s complaints 
against Schelling: first, his critique of Schelling’s metaphysics and second, his critique of 
Schelling’s epistemology.
3.2 The Substance of the Critique: Metaphysics
Schopenhauer had a number of substantial criticisms of Schelling’s philosophy, but most 
of them are centered on the notion that Schelling transgressed the epistemological 
boundaries established by Kant and illicitly applied representational forms to areas be­
yond the jurisdiction of the principle of sufficient reason, and specifically to the thing in 
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itself. In his marginal notes to Schelling’s philosophy, Schopenhauer records this re­
sponse to a reading of Schelling’s 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism:
It is one of the craziest excesses of the human mind that, after Kant’s appearance, 
it has been possible for it to presume to demonstrate according to laws of spatiali­
ty and to others valid for experience that which is said to be the supersensuous 
ground of all consciousness, for which experience is first possible. (MR2, 384–85)
In similar vein, Schopenhauer writes this about the (1809) Freedom essay:
Everything comes down to the fact that, underlying man’s phenomenal appear­
ance in time, there is something outside all time as well as outside all the condi­
tions of the (p. 53) phenomenon. If we try to adapt these conditions to the other­
wise correct concept of that something, then we get monstra. (MR2, 353)
The most mendacious aspect of that claim, in Schopenhauer’s opinion, was the idea of a 
discrete intellectual faculty that bypassed the understanding, the faculty of intellectual in­
tuition. Schopenhauer regards intellectual intuition as a sort of cheap circus trick, secret 
evidence on behalf of the cause, an unverifiable, unteachable special sense. “Here is the 
breastwork behind which Fichte and Schelling hide from all arguments; they assert that 
they see something apart which no one sees except them and their mob” (MR2, 381). We 
will address the problem of intellectual intuition at greater length momentarily, but 
Schopenhauer’s great proof against it was that he detected in the reported results of such 
an intuitive grasp of metaphysical truths a mere reproduction of the structures of phe­
nomenal knowledge, or even, as we shall see, something worse: “That their observations 
[taken from intellectual intuition] of the transcendental ego’s way of acting are false is 
seen from their describing that way of acting as occurring according to the laws of the 
empirical ego” (MR2, 381).
Accordingly, Schelling’s supposed descriptions of metaphysical reality are simply a 
warmed-over duplication of empirical reality. In contrast to his own method (to which we 
will soon turn), Schopenhauer accuses Schelling of “secretly abstracting metaphysics 
ahead of time from the empirical sciences and then … finding a priori what it had learned 
a posteriori.” (SW4, 2 [WN, 323]).9 Schopenhauer applies a form of this same criticism to 
Schelling’s ethical reasoning which, Schopenhauer argues, betrays a misunderstanding of 
the relation between the transcendent and the empirical registers. While acknowledging 
the independence of the human essence from temporality, Schelling nevertheless attribut­
es change to it: he “speaks of punishment that is a consequence of the soul’s deed, of its 
future state and so on. In short, he presents the entire world as an event in accordance 
with finite laws, an event that flows out of an action of God and has a final 
purpose” (MR2, 376).
Schopenhauer’s criticism of Schelling’s earlier Identity philosophy hangs on the specific 
accusation that Schelling has imported the subject–object distinction, which is a feature 
(the defining feature) of representational consciousness, into the transcendent realm of 
the thing in itself. Schelling’s philosophical project involved deriving first the subjective 
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world of consciousness and second the objective world of nature from a prior and ground­
ing identity or Absolute. “The basis of our consciousness, its falling apart into subjective 
and objective, is ‘explained’ by that philosophy trying to refer it to laws according to 
which it must be so and not otherwise. But where do these come from? From the 
understanding!” (MR2, 378). Schelling offends both when he imports concepts of the un­
derstanding wholesale into the transcendent realm—such as the concepts of causation 
and, more generally, temporality and change, which are needed to grasp the derivation of 
the object from the subject and vice versa—and when he modifies concepts of under­
standing to indicate the distinctiveness of the metaphysical—such as when he entertains 
the thought of an absolute subject, an object-less subject, which Schopenhauer considers 
nonsense. The Identity philosophy does not provide Schelling the philosophical (p. 54) re­
sources to develop and articulate an appropriate conception of the supersensible. Again, 
Schelling tries to resolve the problem with the magical solution of intellectual intuition 
(or rational intuition, as Schopenhauer sometimes calls it), to which Schopenhauer 
replies:
Very little is clear to me about this method, but enough to know that it proceeds 
according to the principle of sufficient reason in its various forms [i.e., it doesn’t 
successfully transcend experience]. Since rational intuition has passed me by com­
pletely, I forgo the deep wisdom that such construction contains. … Indeed, this is 
true to such an extent that—strange to say—whenever someone is teaching this 
deep wisdom, it is as if I can hear only the dronings of atrocious and extremely te­
dious windbags. (SW2, 31 [WWR1, 48])
Schopenhauer hints, moreover, that intellectual intuition is not just a projection of the 
empirical on the transcendental but also projects a specifically religious metaphysics, 
thus connecting his critique with Kant’s. For instance, he describes Schelling’s “Absolute” 
unity of subject and object as “reverend [ehrwürdig]” (2:30) and refers to the public 
record of Schelling’s philosophy (as opposed to the private deliverances of his “intellectu­
al intuition”) as something accessible, by contrast, to “the laity [uns Profanen]” (2:31). We 
will return to this important point later.
In his middle-period system, with the Freedom essay, Schelling had abandoned the con­
ception of an Absolute as subject–object identity for a metaphysical conception of primal 
will, which plays the role of God’s material “ground.” Schopenhauer has limited praise for 
this move: “Schelling himself later realized that metaphysical problems cannot be dis­
missed through peremptory assertions [and] he provided a real metaphysical attempt in 
his treatise on freedom.” But Schopenhauer does not by any means think Schelling has 
overcome his methodological difficulties, describing the essay as “a mere fantasy, a tall 
tale” (SW5, 29 [PP1, 28]). In BM, Schopenhauer reports that the Freedom essay contains
. . . an extensive report on a god with whom the esteemed author betrays an inti­
mate acquaintance, since he even describes his coming into existence; it is only to 
be regretted that he does not mention in a single word how he came to this ac­
quaintance. (SW4, 84 [FW, 99])
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Although Schopenhauer’s critical concerns are not without merit, they do not seem to 
warrant the level of invective he displays. The complaint that Schelling illicitly applied 
transcendental categories to transcendent experience can be equally urged against Kant, 
as Schopenhauer himself noted: he roundly condemns Kant for asserting that the thing in 
itself “affects” the subject with sensations, which are the raw material of cognition. This 
inference is based on the law of causality, whose proper sphere of operation is within 
experience, not between experience and the thing in itself (SW2, 516–17 [WWR1, 463]). 
And Kant was certainly also liable to the charge of smuggling theological (p. 55) pieties in­
to metaphysics. So, this error on its own cannot explain the virulence of Schopenhauer’s 
critique.
But, more significantly, it is not at all clear that Schopenhauer has resources any different 
from intellectual intuition for discovering and articulating what lies outside experience. In 
his notes, after rejecting Schelling’s intellectual intuition Schopenhauer wrote, in the con­
text of Kant’s thing = x (i.e., thing in itself),
Instead of this [x], the genuine, that is to say the critical, philosopher should do 
theoretically what the virtuous man does practically. Thus the latter does not make 
the desire attaching to him through his sensuous nature into an absolute desire, 
but follows the better will in him without associating it with that desire, as for ex­
ample with a reward, and thus to want only relatively and not absolutely what is 
good. In just the same way, the genuine critical philosopher separates his better 
knowledge from the conditions of empirical knowledge and does not carry these 
over into the former knowledge (as does the sensuous man his sensuous pleasures 
into paradise because he himself does not like to enter this without them). He 
does not use these as a bridge to unite the two worlds (like the sensuous believer 
who uses reward as a bridge to virtue). On the contrary, he coldly and imper­
turbably leaves behind the conditions of his empirical knowledge, content to have 
clearly separated the better knowledge from that other, and to have recognized 
the twofold nature of his being. (HN2, 328 [MR2, 376–77])
Schopenhauer clearly articulates a will to depart from the empirical into the metaphysi­
cal, but the mechanism for doing so—the “better knowledge” [beβre Erkenntniβ]—re­
mains undefined. Schopenhauer largely abandoned the term “better knowledge” in his 
published writings, using other vocabulary to explore the question of epistemic access. 
But it remains as yet an open question how this is distinct from an intellectual intuition. 
We think that Schopenhauer need not be anxious on this account: he does in fact have a 
distinct method, and one that is not subject to the criticisms he makes of Schelling’s use 
of intellectual intuition. It is to this notion of intellectual intuition that we now turn.
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3.3 The Substance of the Critique: Intellectual 
Intuition
Schopenhauer has a ready vocabulary of abuse against Schelling for his metaphysical 
speculations and his favored instrument of intellectual intuition. We have looked at 
Schopenhauer’s justified philosophical concerns with Schelling’s metaphysics, but we 
have not yet seen him provide a philosophically motivated critique of intellectual intu­
ition. But if we are to see how his own method of epistemic access to the metaphysical 
truths avoids the problems of intellectual intuition, we need to do so now.
(p. 56) Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant in BM is helpful in this regard. This critique is dif­
ferent from that offered in the long Appendix to WWR1. There, he focuses on theoretical 
issues, including the one discussed briefly earlier criticizing Kant’s illicit projection of the 
concept of cause onto the thing in itself (SW2, 515–17 [WWR1, 462–64]). Here, by con­
trast, Schopenhauer is interested in practical issues, and he introduces his discussion 
with brief genealogy of the concept of intellectual intuition.
Schopenhauer explains that the idealist tradition derives the value it gives to intellectual 
intuition from Kant’s categorical imperative, and specifically from the notorious “fact of 
reason [Faktum der Vernunft].”10 In the extensive critique of Kant’s ethics Schopenhauer 
offers in §6 of BM, he starts by making it clear that Kant should not be read (as the “fact 
of reason” obviously suggests) as arguing that morality has some empirical basis. In the 
first place, Schopenhauer focuses the rays of his attack precisely on the implausibility of 
a completely a priori account of morality, which would have to be based on “pure con­
cepts a priori, i.e., concepts that as yet have no content,” in other words, “mere shells 
without a core” (SW4, 130 [BM, 134]). (It is noteworthy that Schopenhauer repeats exact­
ly this reproach of emptiness against Schelling.) At first, Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant 
seems to be just as rhetorical as his blasts against Schelling: he goes on to wonder how 
“a couple of totally abstract, utterly substanceless concepts … [could] have the power to 
bring bit and bridle to bear upon the stress [Drang] of desires, the storm of passion, the 
gigantic structure of egoism.” “Now that is something we would like to see” (SW4, 130 
[BM, 134]) he adds, sarcastically.
But a corollary of Kant’s view gestures at a more significant difference: if the ground of 
morality really must be a priori, then it must be a principle of reason. And if reason itself 
is pure (i.e., unmixed with any empirical components), then it cannot be confined to mere­
ly human reason but extended to all rational beings, or even to a being that is nothing but 
reason: “This pure reason, then, is not taken as a cognitive power of human beings, which 
is all that it really is, but hypostasized as something subsisting in itself” (SW4, 131 [BM, 
134]). Here Schopenhauer offers a proto-Nietzschean diagnostic11: Kant is tacitly appeal­
ing to theology (“dear little angels”) and supposing that the “inner, eternal essence of the 
human being consists in reason” (SW4, 132 [BM, 135]). This is, of course, the precise op­
posite of Schopenhauer’s view: that the in-itself of human being is will and that reason is 
decisively subordinate to the will (e.g., SW3, 233–36 [WWR2, 219–22]). Here, though, two 
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things are important: (1) the implications of Schopenhauer’s view not for the will, but for 
his conception of reason; and (2) the consequences of Kant’s (or rather Kant’s followers’) 
mistaken “hypostasis” of reason.
Kant’s followers forget Kant’s own stringent claims that morality must be a priori and not 
empirical. Thus, the “categorical imperative increasingly appears as a hyperphysical 
fact” (SW4, 146 [BM, 148]), and thus the “fact of reason” is the genealogical forebear of 
the notion of intellectual intuition, as Schopenhauer conceives it. As Schopenhauer paints 
it: from Kant’s modest (although mistaken) “fact of reason” there “sprang . . . doctrines of 
a reason that at first just faintly ‘detected’, then clearly ‘perceived’, and finally had full- 
bodied ‘intellectual intuition of’ the ‘supersensible’ ”(SW4, 147 [BM, 148]).
(p. 57) This genealogy sheds considerable light on Schopenhauer’s conception of intellec­
tual intuition; it brings out the fact that Schopenhauer is concerned with the manner in 
which it is primarily intellectual, which is to say bound up with reason. Intellectual intu­
ition is not just any ability to make contact with the thing in itself; it is specifically a ratio­
nal faculty with the ability to grant cognition of the supersensible. The “fact” of Kant’s 
“fact of reason” can make it look as if it has an empirical element. But this is a mistake, 
Schopenhauer argues, as can be seen by looking more carefully (the idealists did not do 
this) at Kant’s own tough-minded rejection of an empirical or a posteriori element in 
morality: that is why the “fact” is in quotation marks, and Kant himself qualifies it as 
“strange.”12 The “factuality” of intellectual (rational) intuition is an illusion: all there is to 
it is a priori conceptual reasoning; but the concepts involved do not actually have any fac­
tual content; they are, as Schopenhauer repeatedly emphasizes, “empty.”
There is another, more subtle, aspect to Schopenhauer’s understanding of intellectual in­
tuition. It is not just that intellectual intuition is a conception of reason that lays claim to 
hyperphysical cognitive access; it is also that Schopenhauer, in his model of intellectual 
intuition (and perhaps tacitly), treats the content of what it accesses as also essentially ra­
tional; there we find specifically the moral law (i.e., the law of practical reason), but gen­
erally (as the doctrine of intellectual or rational intuition expands) we find noumena (i.e., 
objects of thought, intelligible objects).13 Moreover, if the noumenal aspect of something 
is its in-itself, then we, as phenomena with a noumenal aspect, are also in ourselves ratio­
nal. This is one of the reasons why Schopenhauer only uses the term “thing in itself” and 
never noumenon; what we are in our cores is not reason, but will.14
Schopenhauer understands intellectual intuition as involving the pretense that our intel­
lectual or rational faculties have unmediated access to things in themselves. Modesty 
about reason is very important to Schopenhauer.15 There are several reasons why this is 
the case. Most importantly, reason is ultimately the “servant” of the will (SW3, 238 
[WWR2,220). Secondarily, but still importantly, despite the importance he attaches to 
Kant, Schopenhauer is strongly influenced by the empiricist tradition, and especially the 
significance of perceptual knowledge, for which he adopts the Kantian term Anschauung, 
which is customarily translated into English as “intuition.” Intuitions are, to a first ap­
proximation, spatio-temporal particulars, and, although the English term “intuition” is in 
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some ways misleading, Schopenhauer does think that we grasp such particulars directly 
and that they have a vivid impact on us. But intuitions clearly go beyond mere perceptual 
particularity. First, Schopenhauer argues that causal relations are part of intuitive per­
ception; by contrast, Kant thinks that causation is a conceptual determination. This leads 
Schopenhauer to claim that intuitive perception is as important as reasoning in science, 
in some ways more important: intuitive cognition “of cause and effect is indeed intrinsi­
cally deeper, more complete, and more exhaustive than an abstract thought of cause and 
effect” (SW2, 63 [WWR1, 78]). Second, it is intuitive perception and not reason that is the 
touchstone of Schopenhauer’s thought: the two commanding heights of his philosophy, 
the theory of aesthetic experience and of morality, are both resolutely counter-conceptual 
in orientation. As Schopenhauer aphoristically (p. 58) expresses it: “Virtue is as little 
taught as genius: indeed, concepts are just as barren for it [virtue] as they are for 
art” (SW2, 319–20 [WWR1, 298]).
But the third and most salient motivation for Schopenhauer’s modesty about reason is 
that concepts get their content from intuitive perceptions. Schopenhauer defines a con­
cept as a “representation of a representation” (Vorstellung einer Vorstellung [SW2, 49; 
WWR1, 64]; Vorstellungen aus Vorstellungen [SW1, 98; FR, 94]). This definition is up­
wardly recursive (i.e., a concept can be used to represent a group of existing concepts) 
and so concepts are naturally arranged in a hierarchy; but it rests finally upon intuitive 
perceptions so that first-level concepts are representations of intuitive perceptions (SW2, 
48–49 [WWR1, 63–64]). Thus, ultimately, concepts get their content or meaning from intu­
itive perceptions. In a familiar Kantian slogan, concepts without intuitions are empty; al­
though, by contrast, Schopenhauer does not think that intuitions without concepts are 
blind, as does Kant. Indeed, one of his main critiques of Kant is that Kant fails to admit 
the possibility of intuitive knowledge.
Schopenhauer is particularly emphatic about his modest conception of reason because he 
thinks that the term “reason” also underwent a kind of genealogical shift in the work of 
Kant and the Idealists, and he is returning it to its original philosophical meaning. Prior to 
Kant, he argues in FR, the term meant more or less what he means by it; that is, abstract, 
conceptual knowledge and inference (SW1, 110 [FR,105]). But Kant uses the term “un­
derstanding [Verstand]” to mean “conceptual cognition,” thus freeing up the term “rea­
son” to designate something else. What is this something else? Well, at least in the hands 
of the post-Kantian idealists16:
They needed the place and name of reason for an invented, fabricated, or … com­
pletely fictitious faculty that was supposed to rescue them from the perils in which 
Kant had put them, a faculty for immediate, metaphysical knowledge, i.e., one go­
ing beyond all possibility of experience, one grasping the world of things in them­
selves and its relations, hence a faculty that is above all a “consciousness of God”, 
i.e., one that knows the Lord God immediately … a “faculty of the supersensible” 
… designed immediately for metaphysics … an immediate rational intuition of the 
absolute. (SW1, 111–12 [BM, 106–07])
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Why don’t we have a faculty of intellectual intuition, according to Schopenhauer? Be­
cause “concepts … must obtain their material and content from intuitive cognition” (SW1, 
115 [BM, 109]). Intellectual intuition is therefore supposed to be a modification of reason 
that gives reason direct cognitive contact with things in themselves. But there is no such 
faculty because concepts have meaning only in relation to ultimately intuitive cognitive 
content. Without this, they are empty or meaningless.
Intellectual intuition therefore involves the reification of speculative pre-critical meta­
physics; that is, the assumption of the existence of a special faculty for conceptual argu­
mentation that transcends the possibility of experience. But because of Schopenhauer’s 
rearrangement of transcendental idealism, he has no need for any a priori concepts, and 
hence subscribes to the empiricist doctrine of concept-empiricism (i.e., the claim that all 
concepts must trace back to intuitions).17
(p. 59) 3.4 Meaningless Concepts
It is worth dwelling for a minute on the notion of empty and meaningless concepts. Strict­
ly speaking, for Schopenhauer, there are no empty concepts. This follows from his defini­
tion of a concept as a representation of a representation: if there is no intuition for a (con­
ceptual) representation to be a representation of, then there can be no conceptual repre­
sentation.18 Most philosophers prior to the linguistic turn did not consider language as 
methodologically significant or an object of interesting independent investigation: for 
Kant words more or less represent or are tokens for concepts, and analysis can be taken 
up at the level of concepts without loss. Schopenhauer, however, appears to use language 
in a philosophically significant way, to address the problem of abstraction in the empiri­
cist tradition. The obvious way in which concepts can arise from intuitions is that a repre­
sentative or canonical intuition is used to represent a type (i.e., as a concept). A represen­
tative intuition of a dog might stand for the concept DOG, for instance. But it is not obvi­
ous how we can distinguish between the intuition that is serving a conceptual role and a 
regular intuition without presupposing that we can already distinguish concepts from in­
tuitions, in which case concepts must have their origin elsewhere than in intuitions. 
Schopenhauer’s modern-sounding solution is that we use language.
[R]epresentations that are sublimated, and thereby decomposed into abstract con­
cepts, have forfeited all their intuitive quality, they would completely escape con­
sciousness and would thus have no value for the intended operations of thought if 
they were not fixed and held fast in our senses by arbitrary signs: these signs are 
words. Therefore insofar as they make up the contents of the lexicon, that is, of 
language, words always refer to general representations, concepts, never to intu­
itive things. (SW1, 99 [BM, 94–95])19
It does not seem to be too strong a reading of the passage to suggest that words are nec­
essary for conceptuality: without words, we would have no epistemic access to concepts. 
While therefore (strictly) Schopenhauer thinks that there cannot be empty concepts, it 
does seem to be consistent with his view that there can be meaningless words, words pre­
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cisely for (nonexistent) concepts that purport to go beyond experience (i.e., beyond any 
intuitive content).
Schopenhauer’s polemics against Schelling’s notion of intellectual intuition are therefore 
quite motivated from a philosophical point of view: Schelling’s use of intellectual intuition 
involves concepts that lack (even possible) intuitive content. Such concepts are literally 
meaningless, “empty verbiage” (SW3, 68 [WWR2, 70]) or “empty shells” (SW3, 92 
[WWR2, 91]; SW2, XX [WWR1, 14). It is this accusation that drives the content (if not the 
affect) of Schopenhauer’s frequent accusation that Schelling is a “windbag” (SW2, 31 
[WW1, 48]), for, if his words are empty, then they are equally just wind as they are “mean­
ingless” marks (e.g., SW2, 40 [WWR1, 56], about Fichte). The critique of intellectual intu­
ition also grounds Schopenhauer’s account of boring books (SW3, 77–79 [WWR2, 77–80]), 
an accusation he often throws at the idealists (e.g., Fichte at SW2, 40 (p. 60) [WWR1, 56], 
and a priori philosophizing at SW5, 139 [PP1, 119]). This sounds like a simple insult, but 
in fact has a special technical application. Boring books are those that are based only on 
concepts rather than intuitions. And books based on concepts can do nothing other than 
elaborate the implicit content of those concepts explicitly, so they do not “introduce any 
really new cognition” (SW3, 78 [WWR2, 78], see also SW1, 103–04 [FR, 98–99]). Only in­
tuition can do that.
Moreover, it is precisely this lack of anchoring content in Schelling’s conceptuality that 
allows it to function as an effective screen on which to project his own fantasy content. 
But Schopenhauer does not think Schelling is projecting a personal content; rather, 
Schelling becomes a conduit for the projection of generalized cultural content (i.e., Chris­
tian dogma).
This, then, is the reason that Schopenhauer rejects intellectual intuition and abuses those 
who claim it for an epistemological tool. But we need to be cautious about the conclu­
sions we can draw from this critique for Schopenhauer’s own positive philosophy. For in­
stance, we believe that Julian Young draws too sweeping a conclusion from the vehe­
mence of Schopenhauer’s critique in arguing that, in rejecting the idealists’ faculty for 
metaphysical insight into the supersensible, Schopenhauer also rejected the project of 
metaphysics. Young argues that Schopenhauer’s critique of the notion of intellectual intu­
ition shows that the “traditional” reading of Schopenhauer must be incorrect. This tradi­
tional reading sees him “as basing his own metaphysics on direct encounters with the 
thing in itself; on what is in fact if not in name, intellectual intuition”20; but endorsing in­
tellectual intuition would be a “betrayal of Kant” and his intellectual heritage.21 Young is 
certainly right that Schopenhauer connects his attacks on his German Idealist “band of 
brothers” with his intellectual fealty to Kant. Indeed, the affective structures of 
Schopenhauer’s reception of the idealists comprise in some ways the prototype of modern 
analytic philosophy’s reception of the idealists. But Young interprets this as evidence in 
support of the view that Schopenhauer in fact does want to respect Kant’s epistemic con­
straints and therefore that his claims that the thing in itself is will should be understood 
as falling short of a transcendent metaphysics.
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This interpretation, or set of interpretations, is common in the literature.22 And Schopen­
hauer can reasonably be construed as conflicted on the matter. On the one hand, he clear­
ly states that “the will is thing in itself” (SW2, 131 [WWR1, 135]). On the other, especially 
in WWR2, he appears equally clearly to deny this, arguing that the thing in itself only “ap­
pears, which is to say is cognized, as will” (SW3, 221 [WWR2, 209]).23
But, whichever is the case, Schopenhauer’s critique of intellectual intuition is not a rea­
son for thinking that Schopenhauer himself is not trying to develop a transcendent meta­
physics in which the Kantian thing in itself is identified as will. The problem with intellec­
tual intuition, as we have shown, is not that it promises the impossible—access to the 
transcendent—but rather that, as a specific cognitive strategy, it is misplaced. And this 
leaves the door open to the possibility that there are other, legitimate, cognitive strate­
gies that can yield metaphysical knowledge, for there may be a species of nonintellectual 
intuition that constitutes or provides the bridge to the thing in itself. Schopenhauer may 
be denying the intellectual not the intuition. This view is indeed prima facie plausible 
(p. 61) because of Schopenhauer’s critique of the role of the intellect in general, especial­
ly in comparison with his contemporaries.
To be sure, Schopenhauer never claimed we have an intuition of the thing in itself. When 
he introduces the “deduction” of the will as thing in itself in WWR1, he contrasts our ex­
ternal cognition of our bodies with the special “inner” cognition or awareness we have of 
our bodies as will. But he consistently uses the term “intuition” to refer to our external, 
representational cognition, for example:
The will makes itself known as the essence in itself of our own body, as that which 
it is besides being an object of intuition. (SW2, 126 [WW1, 130]; emphasis added)
And in WWR2 he clearly states that “cognition of the will in self-consciousness is … not an 
intuition of the will” (SW3, 280 [WW2, 260]). In some ways, it is clear why Schopenhauer 
does this. He probably has in mind Kant’s seamless view of experience, where inner expe­
rience (although structured only temporally) is not qualitatively distinct from outer expe­
rience (despite the fact that the latter is structured spatiotemporally): they both yield on­
ly knowledge of things—including ourselves—as appearances, not how they are in them­
selves. Such a seamless view of experience is probably the tacit presupposition governing 
the inference of those, like Young, who assume that Schopenhauer’s rejection of intellec­
tual intuition must entail a rejection of any transcendent metaphysics.
It is clear that Schopenhauer wants to break with Kant on this issue: he summarizes 
Kant’s view (SW3, 219 [WWR2, 207]) and then immediately qualifies it by saying “I ac­
cept this for everything except the cognition everyone has of his own willing: this is nei­
ther an intuition (because all intuition is spatial), nor is it empty.” He clearly thinks we 
have some form of access to ourselves (or rather our bodies) as will in inner awareness. 
He sometimes terms this “cognition [Erkenntnis]” (e.g., SW2, 121 [WW1, 126]). He is 
pretty clear that, whatever it is, it is “direct” and not mediated. But the term “cognition” 
is obviously going to raise similar Kantian issues, and so he often equivocates, terming it 
a form of “consciousness [Bewußtsein]” (SW2, 123 [WWR1, 128]) or, in perhaps the best 
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term he developed, a “wholly immediate awareness [Innewerden]” (SW3, 280 [WWR2, 
260]). But he does not hesitate about at least one thing: the philosophical task involves 
“raising immediate consciousness, concrete cognition, to rational knowledge or transfer­
ring it to abstract cognition” (SW2, 122 [WWR1, 127]) In other words, whatever the sui 
generis inner awareness of ourselves (bodies) as will is, it is functionally equivalent to an 
intuition in that it plays the same content-determining role as intuitions do in relation to 
concepts.
Schopenhauer’s critique of intellectual intuition in Schelling is therefore not (on its own) 
evidence that Schopenhauer must be interpreted as giving up access to the thing in itself 
and as offering only a “hermeneutic” interpretation of experience as a whole. Schopen­
hauer, correctly understood, has a consistent way of rejecting Schelling and asserting his 
own metaphysics. Of course, there remain other objections, alluded to briefly earlier, op­
erating from the Kantian axiom that the seamlessness of inner and outer experience en­
tails the blanket inaccessibility of the thing in itself.
(p. 62) It is possible to resist these objections, and there is currently a lively debate on the 
issue in the literature.24 Robert Wicks mentions, for instance, a kind of “veil of percep­
tion” model in which subtraction of transcendental forms of space and causality leaves in­
ner awareness closer to the thing in itself than fully transcendentally realized intuitions: 
inner awareness of the will has fewer “veils,” as it were.25 Without being able to settle the 
issues here, this kind of interpretation could see Schopenhauer as an early practitioner of 
a kind of “phenomenology of the extreme” in which unusual “experiences” break through 
the ordinary and give us more fundamental insight.
On the other hand, the best evidence that Schopenhauer really does take his strictures on 
Schelling’s intellectual intuition seriously is his own use of hermeneutic vocabulary to 
characterize the ultimate status of the will, what Young calls (“with some reservations”) 
“the hermeneutic Schopenhauer.”26 The “deduction” of the will in WWR1 §18 relies on a 
thought experiment in which the world would “pass by us strange and 
meaningless” (SW2, 113 [WWR1, 119]) if it were only representation, suggesting that will 
provides the “meaning” of the world; will is therefore the “solution to a riddle” (SW2, 119 
[WWR1, 124]), the “riddle of existence” (SW2, 168 [WWR1, 166]). Similarly, in WWR2 he 
presents metaphysics as (or on an analogy to) “deciphering” the meaning of a text (SW3, 
204f [WWR2, 193]).
But is this really evidence that Schopenhauer ultimately realizes that his metaphysical 
task is too much like Schelling’s intellectual intuition and should be (re)construed 
hermeneutically, not literally? It is not obvious, for the metaphysical understanding of will 
is able to give “meaning” to the world as representation precisely because it provides its 
content. The hermeneutic view of the will depends precisely on the metaphysical: intu­
itive representations give “meaning” to conceptual representations in the same way that 
the will gives meaning to all representation.
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3.5 Conclusion
Schopenhauer’s abusive language toward Schelling is, as we earlier quoted one contem­
porary as saying, “unbefitting a scholar.” And indeed it is redundant, in that Schopen­
hauer was perfectly capable of framing his critical objections in legitimately scholarly lan­
guage: in other words, the debate could easily have been conducted on much higher 
ground. That said, we have tried to show that attending to the nature and vehemence of 
the insults yields genuinely interesting results. On the one hand, the accusations of mean­
inglessness and “windbaggery” reinforce the legitimate criticism that Schelling’s epis­
temic methods derive from a hypertrophied conception of reason. On the other hand, the 
intensity and tedious repetition of Schopenhauer’s abusive language point perhaps more 
to the proximity of his philosophy to that of Schelling than to the distance. Indeed, both 
are developing metaphysics (a metaphysics, as Schelling comes to conceive it, of will) 
with full and conflicted awareness of the Kantian epistemic strictures against meta­
physics. (p. 63) In view of this, Schopenhauer is particularly concerned to mark his own 
project as legitimate by highlighting the manner in which he avoids Schelling’s errors. 
Schelling was, perhaps, too close for comfort.
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